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Introduction
Th e topic of immunity of parliamentarians and holders of high offi  ces of state is 
a widely debated one,2 since the immunity regime entails a delicate balance be-
tween, on the one hand, the necessity to facilitate the independence and unim-
peded execution of the offi  ce or mandate and, on the other hand, the need to 
uphold the rule of law and to safeguard access to legal remedies for all citizens 
equally, regardless of their status. Both of these needs are central to the function-
ing of a democratic state. While this is recognised in virtually all democratic systems, 
the dilemma of immunity becomes manifest in the question for legislators of how 
to strike a fair balance.
Th e debate concerning immunity of high state offi  cials became all the more 
‘urgent’ in Italy, when the Italian Parliament passed two laws which would grant 
special immunity to, amongst others, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi.3 At the 
time of the enactment of these laws, criminal proceedings against Mr. Berlusconi 
* Sascha Hardt is a PhD researcher at Maastricht University and fellow of the Montesquieu 
Institute. Dr. Mariolina Eliantonio is an Assistant Professor at Maastricht University. Th is article 
was written with the assistance of Maike Tetz, a second-year student of the European Law School 
of Maastricht University.
¹ Acts 16:31.
² See for a good account of the arguments of that debate S. Wigley, ‘Parliamentary Immunity: 
Protecting Democracy or Protecting Corruption?’, 11 J. of Political Philosophy 1(2003) p. 23-40. It 
must be noted that legal literature focuses almost exclusively on parliamentary immunity, since the 
majority of systems do not feature a separate immunity regime for members of government.
³ Law No. 140 of 20 June 2003, Gazz. Uff . No. 142 and Law No. 124 of 23 July 2008, Gazz. 
Uff . No. 173.
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were pending before several Italian courts. Both laws were struck down by the 
Italian Constitutional Court on grounds of violation of the principle of equality 
and non-observance of the procedure for constitutional amendment.4
Th e aim of this paper is to discuss the more recent one of these rulings and 
place the Italian law in a comparative European context. After sketching the facts 
of the case and the Italian system of immunity a discussion of ruling No. 262/2009 
of the Italian Constitutional Court is provided. Th en the Italian situation and the 
ruling will be placed in a broader context, by elaborating on some general princi-
ples of immunity law and comparing, in the light thereof, the rejec ted Italian law 
to offi  cial immunity as it exists in other European states. It will be concluded that 
the Italian law was a unicum in the European landscape in terms both of its scope 
and its legislative form as ordinary statutory law.
The facts of the case
In 2003, the Italian Parliament passed Law No. 140 of 20 June 2003, containing 
provisions for the execution of Article 68 of the Constitution and on criminal 
proceedings against high offi  ces of state. Pursuant to this statute, any criminal 
proceedings against the President of the Republic, the Presidents of the Senate and 
of the Chamber of Deputies, the President of the Council of Ministers and the 
President of the Constitutional Court were to be suspended as of the time of 
entry into force of the law itself.
With the ruling No. 24 of 13 January 2004, the Italian Constitutional Court 
struck down this piece of legislation on the grounds of the violation of the prin-
ciple of equality and the right of defence, enshrined in Articles 3 and 24 of the 
Constitution.
In 2008, as a response to this ruling of unconstitutionality, the Italian Parlia-
ment passed a second law on the same subject matter, Law No. 124 of 23 July 
2008, containing provisions ordering the suspension of criminal proceedings 
against the high offi  ces of state (hereinafter ‘Law No. 124/2008’). According to 
Article 1(1) of this statute,
[…] any criminal proceedings against individuals which occupy the offi  ces of 
President of the Republic, President of the Senate of the Republic, President of the 
Chamber of Deputies and President of the Council of Ministers shall be suspended 
from the time when the offi  ce or function is taken up until the end of the term in 
4 Corte Costituzionale, rulings No. 24 of 13 Jan. 2004 and No. 262 of 7 Oct. 2009. For an 
English translation of the latter ruling, see <www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/download/doc/
recent_judgments/S_%20262_2009_EN.doc>.
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offi  ce. Th e suspension shall also apply to criminal proceedings for conduct prior to 
taking up the offi  ce or function.
As for the temporal scope of the immunity, sub-section 7 of Article 1 provided 
that the suspension of the criminal proceedings applied ‘to criminal proceedings 
in progress, at every stage, state or instance’ at the time when the law would enter 
into force. Unlike the previous law, sub-section 2 provided for a possibility for the 
accused to waive the suspension of the proceedings.
At the time of the enactment of this piece of legislation, Mr. Berlusconi, the 
current Italian Prime Minister, was subject to criminal proceedings before the 
Tribunale di Milano and the Tribunale di Roma. Once he tried to rely on the pro-
visions of Law No. 124/2008, both courts suspended proceedings and referred 
the question of constitutionality of this law to the Constitutional Court, who, 
according to Article 134 of the Italian Constitution, has jurisdiction to rule upon 
the constitutional legitimacy of laws and acts having the force of law issued by the 
State and the Regions.5
Th e Italian system of immunity for the members of the executive
In the Italian legal system, members of the executive are essentially covered by the 
immunity provided by Article 68 for members of Parliament and that provided 
by Article 96 for the crimes committed in the exercise of their offi  ce.
Article 68 of the Italian Constitution lays down certain substantive and proce-
dural privileges for members of Parliament (and, therefore, also for the presidents 
of the Houses of Parliament) relating both to off ences committed whilst perform-
ing offi  cial duties (sub-section 1) and to off ences committed beyond the ambit of 
offi  cial duties (sub-sections 2 and 3).
In particular, Article 68 renders members of Parliament non-accountable for 
votes cast and opinions expressed in the performance of their function and pro-
hibits measures of personal or home search, arrest (except for cases of fl agrante 
delicto), detention or other forms of deprivation of their personal freedom, unless 
authorised by their respective House of Parliament or in execution of a fi nal court 
sentence. Accordingly, Article 68 does not prohibit measures of prosecution 
other than those mentioned and does not have the eff ect to suspend criminal tri-
als. Th e immunity granted by this article can further not be waived by an indi-
5 Specifi cally with regard to the procedure of concrete constitutional review, please also note 
that, according to Law No. 87 of 1953, any judicial authority who must resolve a dispute that 
requires the application of a legal provision, where it deems the question of constitutionality as 
essential for the resolution of the dispute and not manifestly ungrounded, has both the power and 
the duty to refer that question to the Constitutional Court.
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vidual member of Parliament. Article 68 of the Constitution covers thus members 
of the government as far as they also hold a parliamentary mandate.
For crimes committed in the exercise of their offi  ce, Article 96 stipulates that 
the members of the executive are subject to normal justice, provided that 
authorisation is given by the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate (the latter also 
in case the relevant minister is not a member of any of the two Chambers of Par-
liament).Th is provision applies explicitly to both ordinary ministers and the 
President of the Council of Ministers.
For crimes unrelated to the exercise of their offi  cial duties, there is no immu-
nity for members of the government other than that which they enjoy by virtue 
of the parliamentary mandate they usually (but not necessarily) hold.
The legal issues raised before the Constitutional Court
Th e issues raised by the referring courts are threefold and, with regard to all three 
points, the Constitutional Court agreed with the arguments brought forward by 
the lower courts. In the following, these issues are presented, before an analysis of 
the Constitutional Court’s reply is provided.
May immunity be regulated by way of ordinary legislation?
Th e fi rst issue raised by the referring courts concerns the necessity to regulate im-
munity for high offi  ces by way of provisions of constitutional nature, rather than 
with an ordinary law. In this context, reference was made to Article 138 of the 
Constitution, which governs the procedure for constitutional amendment.6
In essence, the referring courts asserted that the contested Law No. 124/2008 
amended the substance of Article 68 of the Italian Constitution which regulates 
the immunity of the members of Parliament, thereby surreptitiously amending 
the Constitution without following the appropriate procedure.7 In this context, 
it was also argued that the legislation governing the status of the occupants of the 
highest institutional roles of the Republic is in itself a typically constitutional 
matter, since all provisions which limit or defer in time their responsibility count 
6 According to Art. 138, laws amending the text of the Constitution and other constitutional 
laws must be adopted by each of the two parliamentary chambers after two successive debates at 
intervals of no less than three months. In the second reading, such laws must be approved by an 
absolute majority of the members of each house. Th e article also provides for the possibility of a 
subsequent popular referendum (after the publication but before the promulgation of the law) at 
the request of at least one-fi fth of the members of one of the chambers or fi ve hundred thousand 
voters or fi ve of the Regional Councils, unless both chambers have approved the law by a majority 
of two-thirds of their respective members.
7 Referral order No. 397/2008 of the Tribunale di Milano.
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as exceptions to the general principle of the equality of all citizens before the law 
provided for under Article 3 of the Constitution.8
In reply to this point, the Constitutional Court started off  by mentioning that 
constitutional privileges may be classifi ed under the category of institutions aimed 
at protecting the performance of the functions of the constitutional organs by 
protecting the holders of the offi  ces associated with them, and that they manifest 
themselves as specifi c protection for the persons endowed with constitutional 
status, thereby removing them from the application of the ordinary rules and 
creating exception from the principle of equality between citizens.
Th e problem of identifying the quantitative and qualitative limits of the privi-
lege, according to the Court, is connected to that of the necessity of striking a 
delicate, yet essential, balance between the diff erent branches of state, since the 
establishment of these limits may have an impact on the political functioning of 
the various organs. Th is overall institutional architecture, inspired by the principles 
of the separation of powers and their equilibrium, means, in the Court’s view, 
that the legislation governing the privileges contained in the text of the Constitution 
must be understood as a specifi c legislative system, which is the fruit of a particular 
balancing and structuring of constitutional interests; and, consequently, that Parlia-
ment is not permitted to change this system either in peius or in melius through 
ordinary legislation.9
8 According to Art. 3, ‘[a]ll citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law, with-
out distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinion, personal and social conditions. 
[…]’
9 Th e court also responded to some objections on this point which had been raised by the de-
fendant. First, it addressed the point that the privileges can be introduced also through ordinary 
legislation, as is the case for diplomatic immunity provided for under international conventions. To 
this objection, the Court replied that these norms have a constitutional coverage in the ‘generally 
recognised norms of international law’ provided for by Art.10 of the Constitution. Also the special 
provisions governing the privileges of the President of the Council of Ministers and of the ministers 
in relation to off ences committed by them whilst performing offi  cial duties and by co-defendants, 
provided for under Law No. 219 of 5 June 1989, No. 219 were not regarded by the Court as evi-
dence for the possibility of legislating by way of an ordinary law in the area of immunity, since these 
provisions constitute the mere implementation of a constitutional law. Moreover, according to the 
Court, it is not possible to invoke in support of the argument that ordinary legislation is capable of 
establishing the privileges of bodies with constitutional signifi cance the Court’s case-law, in which 
the Court upheld the constitutionality of an ordinary law providing that the votes cast and opinions 
expressed by the members of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary when exercising their functions 
and regarding matters placed before it for discussion may not be subject to review or challenge. In 
this judgment, the Court in fact held that ordinary legislation is capable of regulating the immu-
nity in question only in consideration of the fact that the matter was specifi cally covered under 
constitutional law, and it was strictly limited only to expressions of opinions pertinent to the exer-
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Is immunity meant to protect the offi  ce holder?
Th e second issue which was raised by the referring courts and which is of relevance 
for the debate on immunity concerns the very rationale of the existence of im-
munity, which, according to the referring court of Milan, is meant to protect the 
offi  ce, rather than the offi  ce holder.
With regard to this point, reference was made again to Article 3 of the Consti-
tution, containing the principle of equality, in particular with regard to the prin-
ciple of reasonableness. In particular, it was argued that the right, granted by the 
contested law to the occupant of the high offi  ce, to waive the procedural suspen-
sion was in contrast with the protection of the public offi  ce, in that it granted a 
‘merely elective’ discretion to the individual who benefi ts from it.
In relation to this point, the court took as starting point its earlier ruling No. 
24 of 13 January 2004. In this judgment, which concerned the earlier law on the 
immunity regime for the high offi  ces of state, the court had clarifi ed that the 
suspension of criminal trials for these offi  ces is intended to satisfy some require-
ments external to the proceedings, namely the ‘protection of the untroubled 
performance of the activities associated with the offi  ces in question.’ Th e corollary 
of these unequivocal assertions was that the procedural suspension of proceedings 
for high offi  ces has, in the Court’s view, the rationale of protecting the exercise of 
public functions, guaranteeing to the holders of high offi  ces the untroubled per-
formance of their functions (and, indirectly, of those of the organ to which they 
belong) through the conferral of a specifi c protected status. Th erefore, according 
to the Court, the psychological aspect, which is individual and contingent, of the 
subjective peace of mind of the individual state offi  ce holder did not come into 
consideration. Th ese conclusions were regarded asapplicable also to the suspension 
provided for by the contested provision, since the Court considered that the two 
provisions at stake had the same rationale.
Th e Court rejected the defendant’s arguments according to which the ration-
ales of the two laws were diff erent because the contested legislation provided for 
the right to a waiver (which was not provided in the earlier law),with the result 
that the said legislation had allegedly the goal of protecting not simply the intrin-
sic function of the offi  ce, but also the right of the accused to a defence guaranteed 
under the Constitution, and, therefore, of satisfying requirements internal to the 
trial.
In particular, the Court pointed out that the very report on the draft bill AC 
1442 (which then became Law No. 124/2008) expressly identifi es the rationale 
cise of the rights and duties vested under constitutional law in the members of the Supreme Coun-
cil of the Judiciary.
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for the suspension as the requirement to protect the principles of ‘continuity and 
regularity in the exercise of the highest public functions,’ and not the satisfaction 
of the requirements of the defence.
Secondly, the Court found that it would be unreasonable to consider that the 
contested provision had the goal, either prevalent or exclusive, of protecting the 
right to a defence of accused persons, because in such case, given the general nature 
of this right, expressly provided for under Article 24 of the Constitution, it should 
have applied to all accused who, in view of their own activities, have diffi  culties 
in participating in criminal trials. Moreover, in the Court’s view, it would be inher-
ently unreasonable and disproportionate compared to the goal of guaranteeing to 
the holders of high offi  ces the untroubled performance of their functions to pro-
vide for an absolute legal presumption of a legitimate impediment resulting from 
the sole fact of occupying a public offi  ce. Th is irrebuttable presumption (iuris et de 
iure) would prevent any verifi cation of the actual existence of an impediment to 
appear in proceedings and would render the procedural suspension operative also 
in cases in which there is no impediment.
Th irdly, the Court observed that the legitimate impediment to appear in pro-
ceedings can already be invoked within criminal trials and the contested provision 
was not necessary in order to protect the defence of an accused where he or she is 
prevented from appearing in proceedings for reasons inherently related with the 
high offi  ce occupied by him.
Th e Court, therefore, concluded that the rationale of the contested provision, 
as was the case for the provision at issue in ruling No. 24 of 2004, consisted in 
the protection of the functions of certain constitutional organs, created through 
the introduction of a special suspension of criminal trials.
Do members of the executive deserve a special immunity regime?
Th e third point raised by the referring courts and dealt with by the Constitu-
tional Court concerns the position of the offi  ces covered by the challenged im-
munity provisions and the issue of whether they deserve, because of their features, 
a special immunity regime. In this context, Article 3 of the Constitution was in-
voked on the grounds of the unreasonable diff erence in treatment before the courts, 
since the contested law brought together ‘within one single provision diff erent 
offi  ces not only by virtue of the appointing body, but also the nature of the func-
tions,’ and moreover unreasonably distinguished, ‘in relation to the fundamental 
principles underlying court action, between the Presidents of the Houses of Parlia-
ment and the President of the Council of Ministers [...] and the other members 
of the organs presided by them.’
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Also, the principle of equality had allegedly been violated, due to the diff erence 
in treatment between the legislation introduced for off ences committed beyond 
the ambit of offi  cial duties and that, with constitutional status, governing of-
fences committed whilst performing the offi  cial duties of the four high offi  ces 
concerned. Th is diff erence was claimed to be unreasonable, amongst others, due 
to the provision of a ius singulare for off ences committed beyond the ambit of 
offi  cial duties in favour of the President of the Council of Ministers who, by con-
trast, the Constitution treats as equivalent to other ministers for off ences commit-
ted whilst performing offi  cial duties as a consequence of his position as primus 
inter pares.
With regard to this point, the Court noted that the contested law created a 
clear diff erence in treatment of the high offi  ces compared to all other citizens who 
also carry on activities which the Constitution considers to be equally demanding 
and essential, such as those associated with public offi  ces or functions or, more 
generally, those which citizens have the duty to carry out in order to participate 
in the material or moral progress of society.
Naturally, the Court continued, it may well be true that the principle of equal-
ity requires that, whereas equal situations require equal treatment, diff erent situ-
ations may require diff erent arrangements. However, according to the Court, there 
certainly was a violation of the principle of equality with specifi c reference to the 
high offi  ces of state contemplated under the contested provision, specifi cally with 
regard to the diff erence in treatment between the presidents and the members of 
the constitutional organs.
In particular, the Court pointed out that the, albeit signifi cant, diff erences 
which exist on a structural and functional level between the presidents and the 
members of the organs covered by the contested law were not suffi  cient to trans-
form the overall intentions of the Constituent Assembly,10 which were to attribute 
to the Houses of Parliament and to the government, and not to their presidents, 
the functions of respectively enacting legislation (Article 70 of the Constitution) 
and pursuing political and administrative policies (Article 95 of the Constitution). 
In fact, no pre-eminence, in the Court’s view, should be seen in the role of the 
President of the Council of Ministers over the ministers, because he is not the only 
fi gure responsible for government policy, but his role is rather limited to maintain-
ing its unity, promoting and coordinating the activity of ministers, and therefore 
occupies a position traditionally defi ned as primus inter pares.
Also the constitutional regulation of ministerial off ences confi rms, in the Court’s 
view, that the President of the Council of Ministers and the ministers are placed 
¹0 Th e Constituent Assembly was a body elected in 1946 for the purposes of drafting a new 
constitution for Italy.
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on the same level. Th e system laid down under Article 96 of the Constitution and 
Constitutional Law No. 1 of 1989, in fact, provides for the same regime of privi-
leges for these offi  ces, limited to off ences committed whilst performing offi  cial 
duties; these arrangements had been modifi ed by the provision for the suspension 
of trials for off ences committed beyond the ambit of offi  cial duties only for the 
President of the Council of Ministers.
Similarly, according to the Court, there is no signifi cant pre-eminence of the 
presidents of the Houses of Parliament over other members, because all members 
of Parliament participate in the exercise of legislative functions as representatives 
of the Nation and, as such, are subject to the uniform provisions laid down in 
Article 68 of the Constitution. 
Berlusconi’s immunity law in the context of European immunity 
regimes 
In the following, the above considerations of the Italian Constitutional Court are 
juxtaposed with the broad lines of immunities and special procedural regimes for 
parliamentarians and holders of high offi  ces of state11 as they exist throughout 
Europe. In particular, the immunities and procedural provisions for members of 
the government will be compared. No detailed regard will be had, however, for 
the immunities of heads of state. Despite the role heads of state play also in the 
executive of various states,12 most states employ an extensive immunity system for 
their head of state which is formally and materially distinct from that of the 
(other) members of the government. Th e reason for this is that the presidents and 
monarchs fulfi l – contingently in addition to their executive functions – a role as 
representatives of the nation and symbols of national unity, which sets them apart 
from the government. In states whose heads of state have little but ceremonial 
functions in government, they often enjoy wide-ranging inviolability, however, 
off set by political responsibility for their actions borne by the members of the 
government.13
Th e comparison of immunities and procedural regimes in Europe serves to 
illustrate that, while immunity regimes diff er greatly between states, a set of com-
mon basic principles of immunity legislation can be identifi ed. 
¹¹ Following the notion employed by the Corte Costituzionale, these are the offi  ces of prime 
minister (or otherwise head of the government, e.g., chancellor), minister on a national level as well 
as president of (either House of ) Parliament. 
¹² Notably in France and other states which feature a semi-presidential or presidential system of 
government.
13 See, e.g., Art. 42(2) of the Dutch Constitution: ‘Th e King is inviolable; the ministers are 
responsible.’
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It will be seen that, in the light of these principles, the immunity regime intro-
duced by Law No. 124/2008 appears highly unusual, and that this irregularity 
lies, in particular, in three features of the quashed law, namely the fact that (a) the 
quashed law inserts a distinction, in terms of immunity, between the ordinary 
members of a constitutional body (i.e., Parliament and the Government) and the 
head thereof, (b) the lex Berlusconi places immunity at the disposal of the person 
of the offi  ce holder, and (c) the non-constitutional nature of the lex Berlusconi is 
unique amongst immunity regimes in Europe.
After a general categorisation of immunity regimes and procedures, followed 
by a systematic presentation of the systems of 11 European states representing the 
formal and material variety that exist in European immunity legislation, the core 
principles which can be identifi ed among immunity regimes will be outlined. Th e 
three points which set Berlusconi’s quashed immunity law apart will then be shown 
in the light of these principles. 
Immunity regimes in Europe: a categorisation
A discussion of the immunities and special procedural regimes applying to min-
isters, heads of governments and heads of parliaments should, fi rst of all, take into 
account the notable distinction between systems in which government offi  ce is 
compatible with a parliamentary mandate, and those where this is not the case. 
Th e incompatibility of government offi  ce and parliamentary mandate can mainly, 
but not solely, be found in states whose constitutional order emphasises the (for-
mal) separation of powers, to the eff ect that a corresponding rule exists in most 
presidential systems, such as the USA.14 States employing a parliamentarian system 
of government often – but, again, not always – allow the combination of a parlia-
mentary mandate with ministerial offi  ce. In Europe, examples of states where this 
combination is prohibited are the Benelux states, France and Portugal. States in 
which parliamentary mandate and government offi  ce are compatible are Austria, 
Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom. It should, however, be 
noted that, where mandate and offi  ce are compatible, a parliamentary mandate is 
usually not required in order to be eligible for government offi  ce. A notable Eu-
ropean exception is Malta, where only members of the House of Representatives 
may be appointed ministers or prime minister.15
Th e question of compatibility of offi  ce and mandate is important for the issue 
of immunity of members of the government, because, in systems which provide 
¹4 M. van der Hulst, Th e Parliamentary Mandate: A Global Comparative Study (Inter-Parliamen-
tary Union 2000) p. 48-49.
¹5 Art. 80 Maltese Constitution.
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1574019611100036
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Universiteit Maastricht, on 23 Sep 2021 at 12:13:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
27Berlusconi’s Immunity Law in a Comparative Perspective
for this compatibility, members of the government very frequently do hold a 
parliamentary mandate in addition to their ministerial offi  ce, which allows them 
to enjoy parliamentary immunity. Th us, even in the absence of a special immu-
nity regime for members of the government, ministers and heads of government 
enjoy the same set of immunities as other parliamentarians. 
Th erefore, the primary point of reference for comparison for those states whose 
systems provide for the compatibility of offi  ce and mandate must be the systems 
of parliamentary immunity which the respective states use. In these states, mem-
bers of the government who do hold a parliamentary mandate are protected in 
the same way as other parliamentarians. Th ose who are not parliamentarians do 
not enjoy immunity, unless there are special provisions to that eff ect. Th is is the 
reason why states in which government offi  ce is compatible with a parliamentary 
mandate sometimes do provide for a special set of immunities and/or a special 
procedural regime for members of the government. Such a special procedural 
regime may, for instance, include the use of the highest court or a special desig-
nated court for criminal trials of the offi  ce-holders in question, or a requirement 
that the prosecution of offi  ce-holders be authorised by (a Chamber of ) Parliament. 
Th ose systems in which membership of Parliament and the government are 
incompatible require a special immunity regime for government offi  ces if those 
are to enjoy immunity at all. 
Immunity regimes compared
Th e table below gives an overview of the respective immunity regimes for parlia-
mentarians and holders of government offi  ce of 11 European states. Th ese states 
have been selected on account of their representativeness of the broad lines of 
immunity legislation in Europe. Th e table indicates per state whether government 
offi  ce is compatible with a parliamentary mandate. In addition, both the immu-
nity regime applicable to parliamentarians and, as the case may be, that which 
applies to ministers and heads of government (including special procedural regimes, 
such as special designated trial courts) are described in brief with a reference to 
the respective constitutional provision. In describing diff erent forms of immunity 
for parliamentarians, the table distinguishes between non-accountability and 
other immunities (inviolability). Non-accountability refers to the freedom of speech 
in Parliament and freedom of the parliamentary vote. All further-reaching provi-
sions are subsumed under the category of inviolability, which, therefore, includes 
procedural obstacles that do not render the offi  ce-holder immune, but only impose 
special requirements for prosecution or trial.
Th e fi rst point to be noted when comparing the immunity regimes listed below 
is that all systems do provide for basic non-accountability of parliamentarians. In 
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most cases, this non-accountability is absolute, i.e., members can only be held 
accountable by the respective Parliament or House itself. Th e only exceptions here 
are Germany and Poland; the fi rst does not provide for non-accountability for 
defamatory insults, the latter provides that the Sejm may authorise judicial pro-
ceedings. 
Most of the states compared provide for a certain degree of inviolability, most 
notably freedom from arrest, except in cases authorised by the relevant Parliament 
or House, or fl agrante delicto. Th e only state where no freedom from arrest can be 
said to exist is the UK.16 In Portugal, freedom from arrest only extends to crimes 
not carrying a prison sentence of more than three years. In the Netherlands, in-
violability (in the form of special requirements for prosecution and the use of the 
Supreme Court as the trial court) is limited to crimes committed in offi  ce.17
In all those states where the parliamentary mandate is compatible with govern-
ment offi  ce, the heads of government and ministers are protected by parliamen-
tary immunity as far as they do hold a seat in Parliament. It is interesting to note 
that, while all states where offi  ce and mandate are incompatible provide for a 
special immunity and/or procedural regime for heads of state and ministers, three 
of the six states where offi  ce and mandate are compatible nonetheless do have such 
an additional system in place. In the UK, Germany and Austria, members of the 
government who are not parliamentarians do not enjoy any immunity or special 
procedure, while those who are parliamentarians are protected as such. In those 
states which have a special regime in place for members of the government despite 
the compatibility of offi  ce and mandate, this can functions as a ‘safety net’ for 
members of the government who are not parliamentarians.
Th e special procedures which apply to ministers and heads of government usu-
ally include that they must be tried by the Supreme Court (e.g., Spain, Th e Neth-
erlands) or a special designated court (e.g., Poland, France) or that charges can 
only be brought by certain offi  cials or at the behest of Parliament (e.g., Belgium, 
Luxemburg). Where members of the government enjoy immunity, it usually 
consists of an authorisation requirement. 
¹6 Since arrest in civil matters (e.g., for debt) has long been abolished. Exceptions are, e.g., arrest 
for contempt of court (also in civil matters) or detention under mental health legislation. 
¹7 So-called ambtsmisdrijven. According to Art. 76(2) of the Dutch Act on the Judiciary (Wet op 
de rechterlijke organisatie) a crime committed by a member of the States-General, a minister or a 
secretary of state qualifi es as ambtsmisdrijf if one of the aggravating circumstances mentioned in 
Art. 44 of the Criminal Code is present. Th ese aggravating circumstances are the violation, by com-
miting the criminal act, of a specifi c duty of the offi  ce, and the making use of the power, opportu-
nity or means aff orded by the off fi ce in commiting the criminal act. 
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Do basic principles of immunity law exist?
In referral order No. 9/2009, the referring judge of the Tribunale di Roma states 
that the contested Italian law constituted a ‘unique case’ in the European landscape 
of immunity. Th e question is thus whether there is a degree of communality be-
tween European immunity regimes which is suffi  cient to make this ‘uniqueness’ 
particularly remarkable, or even to make a doctrinal argument against Berlusconi’s 
law. In other words, is there a core of underlying principles which unites Euro-
pean immunity systems and a deviation from which would be hard to justify for 
objective reasons? 
Th e similarities between the immunity systems compared above seem to suggest 
that such a set of principles does exist. Th ere appears to be far-reaching consensus18 
that parliamentarians and members of the government who may (for the sake of 
a clear separation of powers) not be parliamentarians must be aff orded a certain 
degree of protection from unjustifi ed and contingently politically motivated 
criminal charges.19 Th erefore, criminal trials against parliamentarians and members 
of the government may usually proceed once Parliament, after having scrutinised 
the charged for political motivation, has authorised them. As an extra safeguard, 
it is frequently only the highest court of a state which may try such cases. How-
ever, there also seems to be consensus that, apart from non-accountability which 
is taken to be a basic requirement for eff ective parliamentary work,20 the applica-
tion of the criminal law must not be barred unconditionally and the immunity 
must not be absolute – nobody may be saved from trial, unless absolutely necessary 
in the interest of other constitutional values, such as the proper working of the 
state. 
Another similarity – in a negative sense – is that none of the compared states’ 
constitutions make any further distinctions in immunity provisions than those 
between the diff erent organs of state; diff erent immunity provisions may exist for 
(the individual chambers of ) Parliament, the Government and the head of state 
respectively, but in no case is there a further diff erentiation between diff erent 
¹8 Th is basic consensus is near-universal. Only very few states in the world do nothave a system 
of parliamentary immunity at all, e.g., Cuba, Belarus and North Korea. See for reference: Parlia-
mentary Immunity, background paper prepared by the Interparliamentary Union (Draft Version), 
Geneva, September 2006.
¹9 In those systems where offi  ce and mandate are compatible and which do not explicitly pro-
vide for additional safeguards for members of the government, the reasons for such an omission can 
probably be attributed to the fact that, in reality, members of the government are most likely to be 
parliamentarians, and to historical reasons: in times when representative democracy and parliamen-
tarianism were more fragile, it was the government which parliamentarians had most to fear from. 
Th is is exemplifi ed by the immunity regimes of many young or ‘troubled’ democracies, where par-
liamentary immunity is often very rigid, such as Armenia, Russia and Turkey.
²0 Van der Hulst, supra n. 14 at p. 63.
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positions within one organ, such as between a member of parliament and the 
president of a chamber, or between a minister and the prime minister or chancel-
lor. Th is may have practical, historic or systemic reasons, as not all constitutions 
recognise functional diff erences between these positions.21 However, where there 
is no such de iure distinction between functions, a distinction in immunity provi-
sions could easily be at odds with the principle of equality. Even if de facto func-
tional diff erences exist, these must be regarded as a very weak foundation for an 
instrument as incisive as immunity from criminal trial, as long as they are not 
substantiated by formal – i.e., constitutional – recognition on which diff erences 
in legal status could be based. Also where constitutions do assign diff erent tasks 
to diff erent positions, but where these diff erences do not in themselves justify or 
necessitate a diff erence treatment as regards immunity, the principle of equality 
would potentially be violated. Th e heads of parliamentary chambers and the heads 
of governments are, therefore, generally treated as primi inter pares.
A similarity which carries strong implications as to the underlying principles 
of immunity law lies in the fact that immunity is not usually at the free disposal 
of the member of parliament or the government in his or her personal capacity: 
except in Poland, where parliamentarians may waive their immunity to stand 
criminal trial, and in the UK, where there is the (highly controversial) possibility 
of a personal waiver in defamation suits, only the respective Parliament (or a body 
thereof ) may lift the immunity, while basic non-accountability can usually not be 
lifted at all. Th is fact hints at the existence of a principle according to which im-
munity is meant to serve primarily the offi  ce, not the offi  ceholder personally, even 
though the latter is of course the eventual benefi ciary of its application22 – when 
protected by immunity, the offi  ce holder acts as a proxy for the offi  ce. If immu-
nity provisions were to be interpreted otherwise, this would result in a paradoxical 
inconsistency with the principles of the rule of law and equality before the law 
enshrined in most constitutions of democratic states.
²¹ Th is is particularly true for ministers and prime ministers. Th e Dutch Constitution, for 
example, merely specifi es that the prime minister is the chairman of the Council of Ministers 
(Art. 45) and assigns him a role in the appointment of the other ministers (Art. 48). Th e offi  ce of 
prime minister of the UK has evolved gradually and has only gained statutory recognition, rather 
indirectly, by being assigned a specifi c salary in the Ministers of the Crown Act 1937.
²² Th is argument is aided by the fact that immunity can also have, or be perceived to have, ad-
verse eff ects on the person subject to it. See, e.g., Kart v. Turkey (I+II), ECHR 8 July 2008 and 
2 Dec. 2009 (Grand Chamber), No. 8917/05. In fi rst instance, the European Court of Human 
Rights found a violation of Art. 6 ECHR in that Mr. Kart, a Member of the Turkish Parliament 
was, against his will, barred from standing criminal trial by his immunity. However, this judgment 
was reversed on appeal by the Grand Chamber, which found no violation. 
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Lastly, it is particularly noteworthy that in all states compared any immunity 
which exists is laid down in the state’s constitutional document.23 While this alone 
does not justify the assertion that immunity legislation must necessarily be of 
constitutional nature, the underlying principle is inherent and deeply rooted in 
the system of most democratic constitutions: based on the principle, mentioned 
above, that immunity primarily accrues to the organ or offi  ce of state rather than 
to the person of the offi  ce holder, it is clear that immunity legislation pertaining 
to a constitutional organ regulates the status of that organ vis-à-vis other consti-
tutional organs and the citizens. Th is relationship is inherently a subject for con-
stitutional legislation, as it contributes to defi ning the functioning of the state. 
More compellingly, however, the constitutional status of immunity legislation is 
necessitated by its very nature as an exception to fundamental principles of law. 
Since most states guarantee in their constitutions for the equality of all citizens 
before the law and for a right to a legal remedy in court, immunity provisions will 
inevitably create an exception to these basic constitutional values; for the benefi t 
of the proper working of a state organ, citizens may (temporarily) be denied a 
legal remedy. Th e course of justice is obstructed, if not blocked. Immunity would, 
therefore, generally have to be regarded as unconstitutional, were it not itself 
justifi ed by a higher purpose also enshrined in the constitutional order. Evidently, 
this higher purpose is only present, and recognised by most constitutions, where 
immunity serves the protection of central institutions of the state. Consequently, 
since immunity creates exceptions to the core constitutional value of equality 
before the law against which it must always be balanced, immunity legislation 
must be constitutional legislation by defi nition. States generally adhere to this line 
of reasoning. Th e European Council’s Commission for Democracy through Law 
(Venice Commission) has observed that ‘[a]s a rule, the legal foundation of im-
munity is enshrined in the fundamental statutes of states.’24 Th is means that im-
munity legislation cannot usually be introduced, amended or abolished via the 
avenue of ordinary legislative procedure, and that no immunity exists outside that 
which is stipulated in constitutional legislation.
Th e comparison of a variety of immunity regimes from diff erent countries 
which, however, share certain common elements of constitutionalism (such as the 
general adherence of the constitution to the rule of law and the principle of equal-
ity) thus leads to the conclusion that the existence of a number of core principles 
²³ Th e UK does not have a written constitution in a single document; however, the Bill of Rights 
1689 is considered one of several documents in which important parts of the UK Constitution are 
laid down. 
²4 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Th e Venice Commission), ‘Report on 
the Regime of Parliamentary Immunity’, Strasbourg, 1996, document CDL-INF(1996) 007E, 
para. 17.
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in immunity law can indeed be assumed. Th e principles are: (1) that the neces-
sity of a certain degree of protection is uncontested and that the existence of im-
munity in itself is, therefore, justifi able; (2) that the same immunity should apply 
to diff erent offi  ces within one organ of state, at least where a diff erence in immu-
nity is not necessitated by an appropriate diff erence in the tasks connected to the 
offi  ce; (3) that immunity accrues principally to the offi  ce, not to the person of the 
offi  ce-holder; and (4) that immunity legislation must be constitutional in nature.
Ruling No. 262/2009 in the light of the principles of immunity
From the discussion of ruling No. 262/2009 and from the description of the 
otherwise applicable Italian immunity regime, it is readily apparent that Law No. 
124/2008 provided for a very substantial addition to the regime prescribed by the 
Constitution. While Article 96 of the Constitution explicitly places all members 
of the Italian government within the realm of ordinary criminal justice, however 
subject to authorisation by either chamber of Parliament, the new law envisaged 
an extremely broad immunity: fi rst, trials were to be suspended from the moment 
of taking up offi  ce until the moment of leaving offi  ce. Th is must be taken to apply 
both to trials which relate to criminal acts that had already begun prior to the 
commencement of the term in offi  ce, thus defi nitely unconnected to the exercise 
of the offi  ce, and to those which might occur after that moment. Th is provision 
created thus a protection which is much broader than that granted by Articles 96 
and (for the heads of the Houses of Parliament) 68 of the Constitution, which 
leave any proceedings that are already underway at the moment of taking up offi  ce 
untouched. Th e law also made no distinction between crimes committed in the 
exercise of the offi  ce and crimes committed in an entirely personal capacity. Second, 
while the immunity of Article 96 provides for a possibility for either house of 
Parliament to allow proceedings against a member of government, no such pos-
sibility existed under the new law; a suspension of proceedings would, therefore, 
have taken place by operation of the law.
In addition to the very wide scope of the envisaged immunity, the contested 
law contained three points which were manifestly at odds with the principles es-
tablished above.
First of all, it inserted a distinction between offi  ces which, in all other states 
considered in the above comparison, are treated as equivalent, in terms of immu-
nity, to other offi  ces within the same organ of state. Th e Corte Costituzionale ad-
dressed this point in its ruling on Law No. 124/2008. Among others, it ruled that 
the diff erences between the tasks of the prime minister and the other ministers, 
and the presidents of the Houses and their members respectively, did not warrant 
the envisaged diff erence in immunity regimes. With this opinion, the Court placed 
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itself fi rmly within the company of other European immunity regimes, none of 
which provides for the distinctions prescribed by the contested law, and thus re-
inforced the position that, in the absence of compelling material diff erences between 
the tasks of diff erent offi  ces within one organ, they should enjoy equal immunities.
Another point which made Law No. 124/2008 appear squarely at odds with 
the principles established above was sub-paragraph (2) of Article 1, which pro-
vided that ‘[t]he accused, or his representative endowed with a special power of 
attorney, may at any time waive the suspension,’ thus placing the application of 
the whole immunity entirely at the disposal of the persons occupying the respec-
tive offi  ce. Th e main argument against equipping an offi  ce-holder enjoying im-
munity with such a waiver is that immunity is meant to serve the offi  ce itself, and 
that this function would be undermined it immunity were to be waived by the 
offi  ce-holder in his or her personal interest. Th e Italian Constitutional Court 
confi rmed that the purpose of Law No. 124/2008 was to protect the respective 
offi  ces and thereby recognised this principle. It can be concluded that also the 
possibility of a waiver constituted an unjustifi ed irregularity in the light of the 
basic principles of immunity which are adhered to across Europe. 
Th e Italian Constitutional Court also agreed with the argument that Law No. 
124/2008 was unconstitutional on procedural grounds, since the constitutional 
nature of the provisions it contained required the use of the special legislative 
procedure for constitutional amendment. Th is view is certainly congruent with 
the constitutional logic inherent in most systems, which demands (as explained 
above) that immunity must take the form of constitutional legislation. 
In its assessment of Law No. 124/2008, the Corte Costituzionale has thus 
illustrated that immunity legislation in Italy is bound by a certain set of basic 
rules which, by means of comparison, can be distilled from the – albeit very dif-
ferent – immunity regimes of a variety of European states. Although it is not all 
too surprising that such a set of principles can be identifi ed – since their existence 
is owed to the common constitutional structure and values which most European 
states share – the notion of these basic principles of immunity law is nonetheless 
important, since they dictate the range of legislative options in the inherently 
controversial sphere of immunity legislation.
Conclusion
Legislation in the controversial fi eld of immunity always needs to strike a delicate 
balance between diff erent legal and, by extension, societal needs. In comparing 
the diff erent legislative options at which the constitutional legislators of various 
European states have arrived, it can be observed that, in terms of positive law, this 
balance may take on a variety of shapes in which, in particular, the personal and 
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material scope of immunity diff er greatly. However, ruling No. 262/2009 of the 
Italian Constitutional Court, seen in the light of a large number of other systems 
which adhere to similar constitutional structures, illustrates that immunity legisla-
tion is bound by rules which apply throughout and which are derived from what 
may be seen as a common set of fundamental principles to be found at the basis 
of all European immunity regimes. Hence, immunity is necessarily an exception 
to equality before the law, against which it must be balanced and justifi ed. Because 
of its nature,it may only be regulated on a constitutional level. Finally, immunity 
is an institutional privilege and not a personal one and, in line with the principle 
of equality, distinctions between diff erent offi  ces within one constitutional organ 
are not justifi ed unless the de iure inequality of these offi  ces merits the application 
of diff erent immunity regimes.
On all these points, the Constitutional Court found Law No. 124/2008 to 
have overstretched the tolerance within which most immunity systems are located 
and which also sets limits to the Italian legislator, through the constitution by 
which it is bound.
Th e last word in Italy’s ongoing struggle to strike a permanent immunity bal-
ance has, however, probably not been spoken yet. While the ‘match’ with the 
constitutional court seems to be over for now, the Italian Parliament has passed 
an ordinary law, pursuant to which the president of the Council of Ministers may 
invoke a ‘legitimate impediment’ to appear at a hearing of a criminal proceedings 
in case of concurring exercise of one or more of the functions essential to the ex-
ercise of governmental tasks.25 Th is provision is of a transitory nature, in that it 
will only apply for 18 months, i.e., the time within which Parliament is expected 
to legislate again, by way of a constitutional law, on the immunity regime of the 
prime minister and the ministers. At the time of writing, a bill of constitutional 
rank is being discussed by the government concerning the immunity of the prime 
minister, the ministers and the President of the Republic. Time will tell whether 
the constitutional court will be called upon to intervene again and what its response 
is going to be.
Post scriptum (added at the time of publication)
In a recent ruling,26 the Italian Constitutional Court has declared Law No. 51 of 
7 April 2010 partly unconstitutional. 
Th is law provides in Article 1(3) that judges are to adjourn criminal court 
proceedings against a member of the government if the person concerned can 
invoke a ‘legitimate impediment’ to attending court, among which certain types 
²5 Law No. 51 of 7 April 2010, Gazz. Uff . No. 81.
²6 Corte Costituzionale, ruling No. 27 of 13 Jan. 2011.
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of government business. Th e law also provides, in Article 1(4), that proceedings 
must be adjourned where the presidency of the Council of Ministers (i.e., the 
prime minister) states that the impediment is ‘continuous and related to the car-
rying out of [government functions].’
In the view of the Corte Costituzionale, Article 1(3) is unconstitutional as far 
as it is interpreted in a way which does not allow the criminal court a discretion-
ary decision as to the existence of a ‘legitimate impediment’, whereas Article 1(4) 
is unconstitutional in any event, since it evidently places the discretion to establish 
a ‘legitimate impediment’ with the prime minister, rather than a court. In both 
cases, the Court sees a confl ict with Articles 3 (equality before the law) and 138 
(constitutional amendment procedure) of the Constitution, since Article 1(4) of 
Law No. 51/2010 and the quashed interpretation of Article 1(3) establish an in-
stitutional privilege which, on the one hand, is at odds with the principle of 
equality and, on the other hand, would require a constitutional amendment or a 
statute of constitutional rank.
Apart from these qualifi cations, however, the Constitutional Court leaves the 
remainder of the law on ‘legitimate impediment’ intact. In doing so, it seems to 
accept that this the parts of the law which remain valid do not introduce a new 
element of immunity. Rather, the Court considers them to constitute an addition 
to ordinary criminal procedure.

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